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Forthcoming, Review of Politics 
 
The Limits of Constructivism: 






 Constructivist political theory, championed most 
prominently by John Rawls, builds up a conception of 
justice from the minimal requirements of political life.  
It has two powerful attractions.  It promises a kind of 
civic unity in the face of unresolvable differences about 
the good life.  It also offers a foundation for human 
rights that is secure in the face of those same 
differences.  The very parsimony that is its strength, 
however, deprives it of the resources to condemn some 
atrocities.  Because it focuses on the political aspect of 
persons, it has difficulty cognizing violence done to those 
aspects of the person that are not political, preeminently 
the body.  Constructivism thus can be only a part of an 
acceptable theory of justice. 
 Constructivism develops an account of human rights on 
the basis of a thin conception of the person and her needs, 
abstracting away from controversial conceptions of human 
flourishing, and then deduces basic rights from this thin 
conception.  The hope is that these rights will remain 
robust whatever ends the actual people who comprise a 
society turn out to have.  This strategy works well for 
some rights, notably the right to free speech.  But people 
have urgent needs that go far beyond what is necessary to 
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exercise their moral powers or to participate in democratic 
dialogue. 
 I will focus on one extreme human rights case:  the 
practice of female genital mutilation (FGM), which, I will 
bet that you agree, violates basic human rights.  Doubtless 
Rawls was appalled by the practice. Yet his theory cannot 
generate a basis for condemning it.  A satisfactory 
conception of human rights must draw upon some normative 
source beyond that offered by constructivism.  This 
conclusion is reinforced by considering the work of another 
political liberal, Martha Nussbaum, who offers a more 
coherent basis for rejecting FGM.  Nussbaum accomplishes 
this, I will show, only by silently abandoning 
constructivism. 
 How severe a problem is this for constructivism?  It 
depends on what constructivism is understood to be 
attempting.  If the aspiration is a justificatory structure 
from which a complete account of human rights can be 
deduced, then it fails.  On the other hand, its attractions 
remain powerful if it is understood to articulate a 
political ideal, one which however competes with other 
ideals and so is of indeterminate strength and scope. 
 Part I lays out in outline the familiar political 
theory of Rawls, focusing on his specification of the basic 
liberties.  Part II then tests Rawls against the case of 
FGM, and shows that his theory cannot generate a basis for 
condemning it.  Part III considers possible rejoinders by 
Rawls.  Part IV discusses the implications of the argument. 
 
I.  Rawls’s Constructivism 
 
 Samuel Freeman has observed that the “overriding 
concern” of all of Rawls’s work “is to describe how, if at 
all, a well-ordered society in which all agree on a public 
conception of justice is realistically possible.”1  A well-
ordered society, for Rawls, “is a society all of whose 
members accept, and know that the others accept, the same 
principles (the same conception) of justice.”2  The aim is a 
stable basis for mutually respectful political life in a 
society that is profoundly divided about comprehensive 
moral doctrines.   
                     
1 Samuel Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract:  Essays in Rawlsian 
Political Philosophy (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2007), 4. 
2 John Rawls, “A Kantian Conception of Equality,” in Samuel Freeman, 
ed., Collected Papers (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1999), 
255. 
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This aspiration is possible, Rawls argues, because 
people with different comprehensive conceptions can and 
should reach an “overlapping consensus” on the principles 
of political cooperation.  In an overlapping consensus, 
they may disagree about the ultimate foundations of the 
political principles that govern them, but they agree upon 
the principles, those principles are moral ones, and they 
are affirmed on moral grounds.3 
Political constructivism begins from a conception of 
free and rational persons, which Rawls thinks is implicit 
in modern democratic culture.  It holds that “the 
principles of political justice (content) may be 
represented as the outcome of a certain procedure of 
construction (structure).”4  The parsimonious conception of 
persons and their needs in the original position, and the 
decision procedure modeled in A Theory of Justice, 
generates the two principles of justice. 
The specific conception of justice that Rawls 
endorses, based on the idea of the original position, is 
designed to exclude from the outset controversial 
conceptions of the good.  “Systems of ends are not ranked 
in value”5 in the original position, because the parties do 
not know their conceptions of the good.  Those conceptions 
of the good simply do not figure into reasoning about the 
justice of the basic structure of society.   
The exclusion of conceptions of the good shapes 
Rawls’s position with respect to both the basic liberties 
and the distribution of goods.  Each citizen, Rawls thinks, 
is entitled as a matter of basic justice to a certain set 
of basic liberties, together with a share of primary goods 
that is as equal as possible, subject to inequalities that 
can be justified by the difference principle. 
In response to objections to the specification of the 
principles of justice that he offered in A Theory of 
Justice, Rawls in Political Liberalism elaborated the 
political conception of the person upon which he relied, 
and consequently offered a refined specification of both 
the basic liberties and the objects of distributive 
justice.  Persons are regarded as free and equal in virtue 
of their possessing to a sufficient degree the two powers 
                     
3 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York:  Columbia University 
Press, expanded ed. 1996), 144-50. 
4 Ibid., 90. 
5 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 
1971; revised edition, 1999), 19/17 rev. 
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of moral personality, the capacity for a sense of justice 
and the capacity for a conception of the good.6 
The two moral powers are derived analytically from the 
minimal requirements of human agency and collective self-
government.  No one can act without a conception of the 
good; no collectivity can fairly govern itself without some 
sense of justice.  The constructivist procedure consists 
precisely in building up the conception of justice from 
this political conception of the person.  Rawls thinks that 
any conception of the good that is not analytically 
derivable from the constructivist procedure cannot be the 
basis of social unity, because of the inevitable plurality 
of comprehensive conceptions. 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls explained the priority 
of liberty with the claim that “liberty can be restricted 
only for the sake of liberty itself.”7  Freeman observes 
that even if the scope of this demand is restricted to the 
basic liberties, it is implausibly strong.  Restrictions on 
speech that prevent fraud or false advertising infringe on 
a basic liberty, but do not rise to the level of a human 
rights violation on that account.8 
H.L.A. Hart persuaded Rawls that liberty is not the 
type of thing that can be maximized, and that A Theory of 
Justice did not specify citizens’ most fundamental 
interests sufficiently for this to be a workable criterion 
of justice.9  The idea of the moral powers provided the 
answer that Rawls ultimately endorsed:  these liberties 
were to guarantee the conditions for the development and 
exercise of the moral powers in two “fundamental cases.”  
The first fundamental case is connected with the capacity 
for a sense of justice; it is “the application of the 
principles of justice to the basic structure of society.”10  
This is the basis of the political liberties.  The second 
fundamental case is connected with the capacity for a 
conception of the good; it is “the application of the 
principles of deliberative reason in guiding our conduct 
over a complete life.”11  This is the basis of liberty of 
conscience and freedom of association. 
Rawls’s final position is that “a liberty is more or 
less significant depending on whether it is more or less 
                     
6 Political Liberalism, 103-07. 
7 A Theory of Justice, 244/214 rev. 
8 Samuel Freeman, Rawls (London and New York:  Routledge, 2007), 64-69. 
9 Political Liberalism, 331-34, citing H.L.A. Hart, “Rawls on Liberty 
and Its Priority,” in Norman Daniels, ed., Reading Rawls:  Critical 
Studies of A Theory of Justice (New York:  Basic Books, 1974), 230-52. 
10 Political Liberalism, 332. 
11 Ibid. 
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essentially involved with, or is a more or less necessary 
institutional means to protect, the full and informed and 
effective exercise of the moral powers in one (or both) of 
the two fundamental cases.”12  Freeman observes that 
political discussion thus deserves near-absolute protection 
because it is central to the exercise of the capacity for 
justice.13 The moral powers are protected because they are 
indispensable to social cooperation.14 
On the other hand, in the case of behavior that does 
not concern “constitutional essentials and basic issues of 
justice,”15 it is permissible for a legislature to rely on 
its comprehensive conception.  “Fundamental justice must be 
achieved first.  After that a democratic electorate may 
devote large resources to grand projects in art and science 
if it so chooses.”16  Thus political liberalism “does not 
rule out as a reason the beauty of nature as such or the 
good of wildlife achieved by protecting its habitat.”17  As 
Freeman puts it, “it may well be that majority democratic 
decision by itself is sufficient ‘public reason’ for 
restricting conduct.”18  Thus, for example, the legislature 
could act to “protect a dwindling and endangered species of 
moles that live in unspoiled prairie land that Old 
MacDonald plans to sow in wheat.”19 
Rawls similarly refined his account of the primary 
goods that are the objects of the difference principle.  
The “thin theory of the good” offered in A Theory of 
Justice understood the primary goods as “things that every 
rational man is presumed to want.”20  This elicited Thomas 
Nagel’s objection that there were no primary goods in this 
sense:  some ways of life – religious asceticism, for 
instance - have no use for large amounts of wealth.21  Rawls 
revised his conception of primary goods in much the same 
way he revised his conception of basic liberties.  His 
final position was that the primary goods are citizens’ 
needs understood from a political point of view.  According 
                     
12 Ibid., 335. 
13 Freeman, Rawls, 70. 
14 Ibid., 278, 286, 343, 396.   
15 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness:  A Restatement (Cambridge:  Harvard 
University Press, 2001)(hereafter Restatement), 152. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 152 n. 26; see also Political Liberalism, 214-215.   
18 Freeman, Rawls, 80. 
19 Ibid; see also ibid., 396-97; T.M. Scanlon, “Rawls on Justification,” 
in Samuel Freeman, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 162-63. 
20 See A Theory of Justice, 62/54 rev. 
21 Thomas Nagel, “Rawls on Justice,” in Daniels, 9-10. 
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to the political conception, every person has higher-order 
interests in developing and exercising his moral powers to 
develop a sense of justice and a conception of the good.  
Justice requires “conditions securing for those powers 
their adequate development and full exercise.”22  The 
primary goods are “essential all-purpose means to realize 
the higher-order interests connected with citizens’ moral 
powers and their determinate conceptions of the good (so 
far as the restrictions on information permit the parties 
to know this).”23 
The moral powers are also the basis for Rawls’s 
conception of basic human rights.  These are “a special 
class of urgent rights, such as freedom from slavery and 
serfdom, liberty (but not equal liberty) of conscience, and 
security of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide.”24 
These are “necessary conditions of any system of social 
cooperation.  When they are violated, we have command by 
force, a slave system, and no cooperation of any kind.”25 As 
Freeman puts it, “[h]uman rights are regarded as the 
minimal freedoms, powers, and protections that any person 
needs for the most basic development and exercise of the 
moral powers that enable him or her to engage in social 
cooperation in any society.”26  What distinguishes the basic 
human rights from the rights provided in justice as 
fairness is that the former are so fundamental that, if a 
government violates them, its neighbors are justified in 
invading its territory to put a stop to the violations.27 
 
II.  The FGM objection 
 
A.  Rawls and sex 
 
To see the limitations of Rawls’s conception of human 
rights, begin with his attempts to address the gay rights 
issue.   
In A Theory of Justice, he argued that justice as 
fairness "requires us to show that modes of conduct 
interfere with the basic liberties of others or else 
violate some obligation or natural duty before they can be 
restricted.”  In particular, ideas “that certain kinds of 
                     
22 Political Liberalism, 74. 
23 Ibid., 76. 
24 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge and London:  Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 79. 
25 Ibid., 68. 
26 Freeman, Rawls, 436. 
27 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 78-81, 92-3 n.6. 
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sexual relationships are degrading and shameful, and should 
be prohibited on this basis,” are excluded.28  Thus, 
prohibitions of homosexual sex would violate the priority 
of liberty.   
This conclusion, however, was derived from his premise 
that liberty can only be restricted for the sake of 
liberty.  Once that premise is abandoned, a ban on 
homosexual relationships appears to stand on the same 
footing as the restriction of Old MacDonald’s planting.  
Certainly it is not necessary to be able to engage in any 
particular sex act in order to participate in political 
life.   
Is sexual freedom necessary “to secure the full and 
informed and effective application of citizens’ powers of 
deliberative reason to their forming, revising, and 
rationally pursuing a conception of the good over a 
complete life”?29  Freeman observes that Rawls’s view of 
liberty in his late work is less expansive than John Stuart 
Mill’s, since the idea of a central range of application 
for the basic liberties does not appear in Mill.30  The 
clearest and most forceful case of priority is liberty of 
conscience, the freedom to hold and communicate religious, 
philosophical, and moral convictions.31  But it is obscure 
how this extends beyond freedom of thought, to any 
particular action in the world that a person might want to 
engage in.  The problem lies in the ambiguity of the moral 
power to form and pursue a conception of the good.  In 
order to exercise this power, one must have a menu of 
choices.  But this does not entail the right to have any 
particular option appear on the menu. 
Thomas Pogge observes that Rawls’s conception of the 
moral powers excludes any interest that is specific to some 
citizens and not others.  The right to engage in specific 
conduct – Pogge uses the example of animal sacrifices – is 
“of very little significance to some citizens – and of 
great significance to others.”32  It is not clear how these 
rights and liberties could be mutually adjusted into a 
fully adequate scheme, and the effort “could also be 
socially divisive, as any such balancing would produce 
winners and losers among conceptions of the good.”33  But 
                     
28 A Theory of Justice, 331/291 rev. 
29 Political Liberalism, 335. 
30 Freeman, Rawls, 48, 78-79. 
31 Ibid., 75-76. 
32 Thomas Pogge, John Rawls:  His Life and Theory of Justice (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 2007), 88. 
33 Ibid., 89. 
Limits of Constructivism  Koppelman 
 8
severe restrictions on liberty do not preclude the exercise 
of the moral powers.  “As the case of Immanuel Kant 
demonstrates, it is possible (and even easier with modern 
communications) to develop and exercise the two moral 
powers without ever leaving the vicinity of one’s 
hometown.”34  Sodomy prohibitions are another illustration.  
They restrict some people’s liberty, obviously, but others 
have a strong personal interest in living in the kind of 
society in which sodomy is unheard of, and the presence of 
openly gay people makes them feel like strangers in their 
own neighborhoods, which is not a trivial harm.35  To decide 
that sexual freedom is a protected liberty, the moralistic 
interests of some citizens would have to be balanced 
against the personal interests of others, and 
constructivism has no resources with which to perform such 
balancing. 
Rawls holds that there is “a general presumption 
against imposing legal and other restrictions on conduct 
without sufficient reason.  But this presumption creates no 
special priority for any particular liberty.”36  The control 
of one’s sexual intimacy is part of nearly everyone’s 
conception of the good.  But its value cannot be deduced 
from the moral powers.  It is simply something that most 
people happen to value highly, and that is not enough to 
qualify something as a primary good: 
What are to count as primary goods is not decided by 
asking what general means are essential for achieving 
the final ends which a comprehensive empirical or 
historical survey might show that people usually or 
normally have in common.  There may be few if any such 
ends; and those there are may not serve the purposes 
of a conception of justice.  The characterization of 
primary goods does not rest on such historical or 
social facts.  While the determination of primary 
goods invokes a knowledge of the general circumstances 
and requirements of social life, it does so only in 
light of a conception of the person given in advance.37 
In his last essay, “The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited,” Rawls returned to the gay rights question, 
writing that with respect to family law, the requirements 
of public reason exclude “appeals to monogamy as such, or 
against same-sex marriages,” because such appeals “would 
                     
34 Ibid., 87. 
35 See Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, vol. 4:  
Harmless Wrongdoing (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1988), 39-80. 
36 Political Liberalism, 292. 
37 Ibid., 308. 
Limits of Constructivism  Koppelman 
 9
reflect religious or comprehensive moral doctrines.”38  
Monogamy or opposition to same-sex marriage are however 
policy conclusions, not premises.  Arguments for these 
conclusions might or might not reflect comprehensive 
doctrines.  Moreover, as we have seen, comprehensive 
doctrines are not excluded as a basis for regulating 
conduct when this does not infringe on a basic liberty.  
How could marriage be shown to be a basic liberty in 
Rawls’s terms?  Whose moral powers are damaged by its 
denial?  Rawls concedes, later in the same paragraph, 
“there might be other political values in the light of 
which such a specification would pass muster:  for example, 
if monogamy were necessary for the equality of women, or 
same-sex marriages destructive to the raising and educating 
of children.”39  But of course opponents of same-sex 
marriage, even those whose opposition rests on frankly 
religious grounds, always do allege exactly this.  Patrick 
Devlin, to whom Rawls was specifically responding in A 
Theory of Justice,40 used purely political arguments to 
defend the prohibition of sodomy. 
A few sentences later, he puts his foot down:  
“arguments for considering, say, homosexual relations 
unworthy or degrading” are not appropriate bases for 
political action.  “Thus, in considering whether to make 
homosexual relations between citizens criminal offenses, 
the question is not whether those relations are precluded 
by a worthy idea of the full human good as characterized by 
a sound philosophical and nonreligious view, nor whether 
those of religious faith regard it as sin, but primarily 
whether legislative statutes forbidding those relations 
infringe the civil rights of free and equal democratic 
citizens.”41  But how can he be entitled to say that?  Once 
more, why aren’t gay people in this regard in exactly the 
same position as Old Macdonald? 
 Since sexuality is not necessary to the exercise of 
the moral powers, it is not a matter of constitutional 
essentials.  The legislature could, then, ban same-sex 
marriage, or even private consensual homosexual sex, on the 
basis of its comprehensive views.  Rawls’s theory offers no 
basis for regarding gay rights as a matter of basic 
justice.42 
                     
38 “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in Collected Papers, 587.   
39 Ibid. 
40 See A Theory of Justice, 331 n. 54/291 n. 53 rev. 
41 “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 588. 
42 His weakness in this regard is also noted by Carlos Ball, The 
Morality of Gay Rights (New York:  Routledge, 2003), 22-30. 
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 This gap will trouble some readers less than others.  
Gay rights remain controversial.  I therefore move on to an 
omission that will alarm nearly everyone.  Rawls’s Kantian 
constructivism cannot cognize the injustice of the ritual 
practice, common in some northern parts of Africa, of 
female genital mutilation (FGM).43 
 
B.  Rawls and FGM 
 
FGM is commonly practiced on girls, sometimes as young 
as infancy.  It almost always involves removal of the 
clitoris, and sometimes involves much more radical damage 
to the pubic area.  When medical complications are 
avoided,44 the consequence of FGM is often (not always) that 
women experience a greatly diminished capacity for sexual 
pleasure.45  FGM has been outlawed all over the world,46 and 
it is widely agreed that prohibiting the practice is a 
matter of basic justice for women.  But this condemnation 
is obviously not universal.  If it were, the practice would 
disappear.  As an international statement condemning FGM 
                     
43 I use this example with acknowledgement of the danger, emphasized by 
Yael Tamir and acknowledged by her critics, that Westerners will regard 
this unfamiliar practice with “smug, unjustified self-satisfaction,” 
ignoring the abuses of women’s bodies – the powerful cultural pressures 
that lead to breast implants, tummy tucks, botox injections, and 
anorexia - that are commonplace in our culture.  Yael Tamir, “Hands Off 
Clitoridectomy,” Boston Review, Summer 1996; see also responses in 
Boston Review, Oct./Nov. 1996; Clare Chambers, “Are Breast Implants 
Better than Female Genital Mutilation?  Autonomy, Gender Equality and 
Nussbaum’s Political Liberalism,” Crit. Rev. of Int’l Soc. & Pol. Phil 
7 (Autumn 2004):  1-33. 
44 FGM is frequently performed in unsanitary conditions and may result 
in severe, occasionally life-threatening medical complications.  As 
Western technology spreads, the procedure is increasingly performed by 
medically trained personnel with anesthesia, sterile tools, and 
antibiotics.  See Ellen Gruenbaum, The Female Circumcision Controversy:  
An Anthropological Perspective (Philadelphia:  University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 54-59, 144-49.  Medical professionals 
perform nearly half the operations in Somalia.  Carla Makhlouf 
Obermeyer, “Female Genital Surgeries:  The Known, the Unknown, and the 
Unknowable,” Med. Anthrop. Q. 13(1)(1999): 100 n.21.  Some practices, 
such as infibulations, are especially likely to damage the subject’s 
health, see Gruenbaum, 5-7, but the near-universal condemnation is not 
confined to those practices.  Medical complications are a concern but 
are not at the core of the objection to FGM.  I am aware of no critic 
of FGM who claims that it would be acceptable if performed according to 
normal surgical protocols. 
45 There is considerable variation in the effect on women’s sexual 
experience.  Gruenbaum, 133-157. 
46 See Anika Rahman & Nahid Toubia, Female Genital Mutilation:  A Guide 
to Laws and Policies Worldwide (London and New York: Zed Books, 2000). 
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observed in 1996, “Human behaviours and cultural values, 
however senseless or destructive they may appear from the 
personal and cultural standpoint of others, have meaning 
and fulfil a function for those who practise them.”47   
FGM is not devoid of purpose.  When researchers ask 
African women why they support the practice, they find that 
the women do get something out of it.48  One survey found 
that 82 percent of Egyptian women support a continuation of 
the practice.49  Some think, in accordance with long-settled 
cultural norms, that FGM initiates them into womanhood and 
their tribe.  Some regard the clitoris as unhygienic and 
ugly.  Some regard FGM as necessary to become a real woman.  
Some regard the practice as divinely sanctioned; some think 
that it is a requirement of Islam.  It is often a valued 
marker of ethnic identity.  Particularly in its more severe 
forms, it makes sexual intercourse difficult and so 
increases the likelihood that a woman is a virgin before 
marriage.  It is also thought to enhance a husband’s sexual 
pleasure.  For these reasons, it is sometimes indispensable 
to a woman’s marriageability, in societies in which 
marriage is vital to a woman’s status and security.50  At 
least some of these are genuine goods, and the rest are 
strongly felt to be so.  In order to reject FGM, one must 
argue that they are outweighed by the harm caused by the 
loss of sexual capacity.  But that involves just the kind 
of balancing that, Pogge showed, Rawls was unwilling to do. 
People from many different cultures agree that 
prohibiting the practice is a matter of basic justice for 
women.  Yet, can Rawls say this? 
                     
47 Joint statement by the World Health Organization, UN Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), and UN Population Fund, February 1996, quoted in Gruenbaum, 
198. 
48 See generally Gruenbaum; Sander L. Gilman, “’Barbaric’ Rituals?,” in 
Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, and Martha C. Nussbaum, eds., Is 
Multiculturalism Bad For Women? (Princeton:  Princeton University 
Press, 1999), 53-58.  This is ignored in the summary condemnation of 
FGM by Susan Okin, “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women,” in ibid., 14-
15, and “Reply,” in ibid., 124-25.  She treats FGM as if it were 
obvious that its only purpose is to help men control women. 
49 Obermeyer, 87. 
50 See Gruenbaum; Nahid Toubia, Female Genital Mutilation:  A Call for 
Global Action (Women Ink, 1995), 35-37.  This last factor suggests that 
many who participate in the practice might prefer to live in a world in 
which there were not pressure to conform to the custom, but dare not 
risk their daughters’ economic futures by refusing to participate.  See 
Gerry Mackie, “Ending Footbinding and Infibulation:  A Convention 
Account,” Am. Sociological Rev. 61 (1996):999-1017.  But this does not 
mean that they are not consenting to the practice, given the 
circumstances in which they find themselves. 
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Consider an immigrant mother who wants to have the 
operation performed (by a competent surgeon) on her 
daughter.  Is there a basis in political liberalism, as 
formulated by Rawls, for saying that the state has an 
obligation to interfere with her?  Does not the mother 
satisfy Rawls’s very abstract standards of reasonableness?  
Rawls assumes that the family is an association “in which 
elders (normally parents) have a certain moral and social 
authority.”51  The immigrant mother does not propose to tell 
anyone else how to raise their children.  The principle 
that each parent gets to make value choices on behalf of 
their own children is a time-honored constraint on state 
power in free societies, one on the basis of which people 
could reason in common.  Her comprehensive view, which 
entails FGM, is not an unreasonable one, and “reasonable 
persons will think it unreasonable to use political power, 
should they possess it, to repress comprehensive views that 
are not unreasonable, though different from their own.”52 
It will not do to say simply that political liberalism 
aims to “secure[e] the conditions under which we can 
further our determinate conception of the good, whatever it 
is.”53  FGM does not deprive its victims of their capacity 
to exercise their moral powers.  It does not deprive them 
of primary goods.  It removes an option, of course, but it 
provides other options.  The value of the lost option is 
irrelevant for Rawls’s theory, because “in establishing the 
fair terms of social cooperation (in the case of the basic 
structure) the only relevant feature of persons is their 
possessing the moral powers (to the sufficient minimum 
degree) and having the normal capacities to be a 
cooperating member of society over a complete life.”54  
Sexuality, then, is not a feature of persons that is 
relevant from the standpoint of basic justice.55  Rawls’s 
constructivist procedure asks, “which traditionally 
                     
51 “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 596.  Rawls may be more 
deferential to this authority than his philosophy ought to imply.  See 
Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development:  The Capabilities 
Approach (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2000), 270-83.  But 
even with much less deference, the state would need some reason to 
invade parental prerogatives, and constructivism cannot supply this. 
52 Political Liberalism, 60. 
53 Ibid., 106. 
54 Ibid., 79.  Doubtless Rawls himself would have thought it highly 
relevant, but his constructivism does not capture this concern. 
55 This is also noted in Ball, 22.  Martha Nussbaum observes that Rawls 
implicitly “make[s] personhood reside in (moral and prudential) 
rationality, not in the needs that human beings share with other 
animals.”  Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice:  Disability, 
Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge:  Belknap Press, 2006), 159. 
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recognized principles of freedom and equality, or which 
natural variations thereof, would free and equal moral 
persons themselves agree upon, if they were fairly 
represented solely as such persons and thought of 
themselves as citizens living a complete life in an ongoing 
society?”56  In order for the harm of FGM to be recognized, 
persons have to be represented, not solely as free and 
equal moral persons, but as sexual beings who have the 
vulnerabilities specific to such beings.  FGM does not 
deprive its victims of their moral powers or their normal 
capacities for cooperation.  FGM hurts them in other ways. 
Rawls would clearly deem it permissible for a 
government to ban FGM at the legislative stage.  He demands 
government neutrality toward conceptions of the good only 
with respect to the basic structure.  But the prohibition 
of FGM is a matter of legislative discretion.  It would not 
be required by justice.  The legislature’s discretion, 
moreover, is remarkably broad.  It could rely on its 
comprehensive views about well-being to enact a law 
requiring that girls undergo FGM, in the same spirit in 
which states now require that children be vaccinated 
against disease. 
 
III.  Rawlsian rejoinders 
 
Has Rawls really no resources with which to condemn 
FGM? 
Earlier drafts of this essay have been shown to a 
number of distinguished scholars of Rawls, and they have 
been unanimous in rejecting the claim just made.  This, 
they argue, is an easy case for him.  They have not, 
however, agreed about why.   
There are at least five Rawlsian rejoinders:  (1) 
Rawls condemns FGM as a kind of child abuse; (2) FGM 
permanently deprives girls of a valuable option, thereby 
restricting their equality of opportunity and capacity for 
moral choice; (3) FGM violates women’s basic right to 
health; (4) FGM violates the integrity of the person; (5) 
FGM is an instance of gender inequality.  I will take them 
up in turn. 
 (1)  Child abuse.  Rawls observes that “parents must 
follow some conception of justice (or fairness) with regard 
for their children,” although “within certain limits, this 
is not for political principles to prescribe.”  But those 
                     
56 “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” in Collected Papers, 305, 
emphasis added. 
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limits exist:  justice entails “the prohibition of abuse 
and neglect of children.”57  Is FGM a kind of child abuse? 
This argument depends on clarifying what counts as 
abuse, a problem that Rawls does not explore.  Within the 
terms of political constructivism, abuse would appear to 
consist in treating a child in such a way that the child 
fails to develop its moral powers, or is thwarted in 
exercising those powers as an adult. 
[W]e try to answer the question of children’s 
education entirely within the political conception.  
The state’s concern with their education lies in their 
role as future citizens, and so in such essential 
things as their acquiring the capacity to understand 
the public culture and to participate in its 
institutions, in their being economically independent 
and self-supporting members of society over a complete 
life, and in their developing the political virtues, 
all this from within a political point of view.58 
Persistent beatings are likely to thwart the course of 
moral development contemplated in Chapter 8 of A Theory of 
Justice.  Eamonn Callan has shown that Rawls’s theory 
involves quite demanding educational requirements.  Good 
liberal citizens must be able to distinguish disagreements 
which are the product of the burdens of judgment from those 
which merely reflect prejudice or error.59  In order to do 
this, they must develop a certain measure of ethical 
autonomy.60   
In order for this argument to condemn FGM, it would 
have to be shown that FGM does damage the pertinent moral 
powers.  Women who have had FGM performed upon them are, 
however, fully capable of being good liberal citizens.  
Some of the smartest and most articulate critics of FGM are 
women upon whom the operation has been performed. 
The root of the problem is Rawls’s narrow conception 
of the pertinent moral powers, in which the capacity for 
pleasure has no place.61  Part of the explanation is 
probably that Rawls’s work is from the beginning a reaction 
against utilitarianism, which makes pleasure central to 
moral reasoning.  For Rawls, pleasure is either too 
private, allowing some people to claim an unfair share of 
                     
57 “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 598. 
58 Restatement, 157. 
59 Creating Citizens:  Political Education and Liberal Democracy 
(Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1997), 24-33.   
60  See ibid., 39-42, 214-20. 
61 Pleasure is only made morally pertinent at one point in Rawls’s work, 
in the discussion of the Aristotelian principle.  A Theory of Justice, 
426/374 rev. 
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resources, or too intersubjective, failing to take 
seriously the distinction between persons.62  Might he share 
with practitioners of FGM a certain uneasiness with 
pleasure’s potentially destabilizing power? 
(2)  Restricted moral capacity.  FGM infringes on 
women’s exercise of their moral powers by depriving them of 
a valuable option.  Thus Martha Nussbaum:  “Female genital 
mutilation means the irreversible loss of the capability 
for a type of sexual functioning that many women value 
highly, usually at an age when they are far too young to 
know what value it has or does not have in their own 
life.”63  This makes sense from within the terms of 
Nussbaum’s philosophy, at least when the operation is 
performed on children.64  She is no constructivist; her list 
of basic capabilities that should be guaranteed to everyone 
includes many elements that could not be deduced from 
Rawls’s two moral powers.65  But it is not clear how 
anything like this can be said from within the terms of 
Rawlsian constructivism, which forbids a substantive 
judgment of the comparative goodness of different options.  
Eamonn Callan’s Rawlsian condemnation of FGM raises a 
similar difficulty: 
If the integrity of one’s body is a precondition of 
personal sovereignty in sexual matters, the genital 
mutilation of female children in some cultures is a 
gross violation of their prospective interest in 
sovereignty.  The practice is indefensible because it 
cannot be squared with the moral equality of the 
child’s prospective interest and the adult’s realized 
interest in a zone of personal sovereignty.66 
Rawls, however, has no basis for singling out 
“personal sovereignty in sexual matters” as particularly 
                     
62 Bonnie Honig suggested to me that Rawls, in his determination to move 
beyond utilitarianism, may have failed to appreciate the importance of 
pleasure to human moral life. 
63 Martha Nussbaum, “Judging Other Cultures:  The Case of Genital 
Mutilation,” in Sex and Social Justice (Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 124. 
64 It is less clear that Nussbaum can condemn the operation when 
performed upon adults.  See Chambers. 
65 The list of capabilities appears in many of Nussbaum’s writings.  One 
recent version is Frontiers of Justice, 76-78.  Its elements include 
the ability to live a life of normal duration, the ability to have good 
health, the ability to move about freely, freedom from violence, 
reproductive choice, the ability to imagine, think and reason, the 
ability to laugh and play, political and property rights on an equal 
basis with others, and many other things. 
66 Callan, 147.  Callan does not discuss male circumcision or ear-
piercing. 
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important.  The outlawing of FGM for girls does not 
preserve all options.  It closes off one option while 
opening up others.  Once more, it is not clear how the 
basic moral power to have and pursue a conception of the 
good entails the right to do anything in particular.  
Equality of opportunity only matters if the opportunity 
being foreclosed is indeed a valuable one. 
Another formulation of this rejoinder would begin by 
noting that all citizens are entitled to revise their 
conceptions of the good (in ways that are compatible with 
the right).  This puts limits on the ways a parent can 
treat his children -- a father cannot so restrict the 
choices of his daughter that she cannot make up her own 
mind about the kind of life to live.  FGM in childhood 
often makes it impossible for a daughter, once she reaches 
adulthood, to enjoy her sexuality.67 
This rejoinder would only have force if the child’s 
capacity to revise her conception of the good were being 
impaired for no reason at all.  Then there would be a loss 
of opportunity to exercise the moral powers with nothing at 
all to compensate for it.  However, as we have seen, this 
is not true of FGM. 
(3) The right to health.  It may also be claimed that 
FGM damages a girl’s health.  This cannot refer to the 
danger of infection from the procedure – as noted above, 
that can be controlled by performing it competently under 
sterile conditions – but the impairment of sexual 
functioning.  A healthy person has capacities that are 
harmed by FGM. 
“Health,” however, is a contested concept.  Sickness 
is deviancy from a norm.  The norm is not given by nature.  
The “blight” that strikes corn is labeled a disease because 
humans want the corn crop to survive; otherwise we would 
just talk about the competition between two species.68  
Health is simply a desirable state of affairs.  I agree 
that FGM is damaging to a girl’s health, but only because I 
think that the capacity to orgasm is desirable – a 
conclusion that can’t be derived from Rawlsian 
constructivism.  Rawls writes that the right to medical 
care “falls under the general means necessary to underwrite 
fair equality of opportunity and our capacity to take 
advantage of our basic rights and liberties, and thus to be 
normal and cooperating members of society over a complete 
                     
67 Thanks to Richard Kraut for this formulation. 
68 See Ronald Bayer, Homosexuality and American Psychiatry:  The 
Politics of Diagnosis (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, rev. ed. 
1987), 183-86.   
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life.”69  This is the source of the “urgency” of “treatment 
that restores persons to good health, enabling them to 
resume their normal lives as cooperating members of 
society.”70  But FGM does not impair women’s ability to be 
cooperating members of society.  Condemning FGM on the 
basis of “health” is a cheat, because it assimilates a 
controversial conception of well-being to an 
uncontroversial one, and then relies on the uncontroversial 
one to do the normative work. 
(4) The integrity of the person.  We already noted 
Callan’s claim that FGM violates “the integrity of one’s 
body.”71  Rawls lists “integrity of the person” among the 
basic liberties.72  But there must be limits to this.  It 
must be permissible to perform necessary surgery on 
children, for example.  Does unnecessary surgery count as a 
violation of the integrity of the person?  What counts as 
“unnecessary” is of course deeply contested.  Few people 
are upset by cosmetic surgery for children to eliminate 
medically harmless, but socially stigmatizing, deformities.  
(It seems strange to us that North Africans regard the 
clitoris as a deformity, but reduction surgery is routinely 
performed in the United States on female infants with 
unusually large clitorises.)  Many Americans pierce the 
ears of their daughters (but not their sons) to accommodate 
earrings; this goes almost completely unremarked.  Male 
circumcision has not produced anything like the 
condemnation that FGM has provoked, because its ritual 
significance is more widely appreciated and its effect on 
sexual pleasure is much more uncertain.  Do these practices 
violate fundamental human rights?  If a well-ordered 
society has a neighbor where the piercing of young girls’ 
ears is customarily practiced and tolerated by the state, 
would military intervention be warranted?  
When Rawls cites the integrity of the person, he most 
obviously has in mind violations of bodily integrity, such 
as assault or torture, that impair the exercise of the 
moral powers.  As we have already seen, FGM does not do 
this.  Since it does not, the Rawlsian right of integrity 
cannot extend this far. 
(5) Gender inequality.  Rawls might also condemn FGM 
as a variety of gender inequality.  The practice is only 
done to women, it harms women, and it exists for the sake 
of satisfying male concerns about female chastity and male 
                     
69 Restatement, 174. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Callan, 147. 
72 Political Liberalism, 291. 
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pleasure.  But, again, this only works if what’s lost is 
valuable.  Ear-piercing and male circumcision are also sex-
specific marks of inequality that reinforce traditions of 
female subordination.  If one is looking for sex-specific 
practices that violate Rawlsian justice, FGM is less 
objectionable than the Western practice of enlarging 
women’s breasts with silicone implants – a procedure that 
is usually performed on consenting adults, but in response 
to social pressures that are often experienced as crushing.  
The harms caused by implants include chronic pain and an 
increased likelihood of early death, since the implants 
make it harder to detect incipient breast cancer.73  These 
obviously compromise any exercise of the moral powers. 
Once more, as with children, it is only interference 
with the moral powers that raises fundamental issues of 
justice.  “The equal rights of women and the basic rights 
of their children as future citizens are inalienable and 
protect them wherever they are.  Gender distinctions 
limiting those rights and liberties are excluded.”74  The 
italics are mine, and the italicized language is 
restrictive.  Since FGM does not impair women’s rights and 
liberties as citizens, it does not violate basic justice. 
It may also be said that FGM is unjust because it is 
only done to women, and thus rests on a view that the 
deprivation of sexual pleasure is trivial if it happens to 
women, but not to men.  Such a view obviously treats women 
less respectfully than men.  This response however 
implicitly relies on the assumption, which we have seen is 
unavailable to the Rawlsian constructivist, that sexual 
pleasure is something that matters a lot.  Once more, other 
gender-asymmetrical burdens, such as the denial to Jewish 
males of the sensations of sex with a foreskin, are less 
troubling.75 
 
IV.  The knife in the clam 
 
 How big a problem is constructivism’s inability to 
address FGM?  It depends on how important it is to exclude 
nonconstructivist ideas of the good from our conception of 
justice.  Rawls fears that such nonconstructivist ideas 
cannot be the basis of social unity.  In this, we can now 
conclude, he is too pessimistic.  There is an impressive 
amount of agreement about FGM, even though constructivism 
lacks the resources to condemn it. 
                     
73 See Chambers, 23. 
74 “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 599. 
75 Thanks to Anthony Laden for pressing me on this point. 
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 The source of the pessimism, for Rawls, is the 
experience of inevitable pluralism.  “Our individual and 
associative points of view, intellectual affinities, and 
affective attachments, are too diverse, especially in a 
free society, to enable those doctrines to serve as the 
basis of lasting and reasoned political agreement.”76  For 
this reason, justice cannot depend on any comprehensive 
conception. 
 There is a revealing slippage in Rawls’s understanding 
of what a comprehensive conception is.  A conception is 
comprehensive, Rawls explains, “when it includes 
conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals 
of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and 
of familial and associational relationships, and much else 
that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life 
as a whole.”77  “A conception is fully comprehensive if it 
covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather 
precisely articulated system.”78  There cannot be social 
consensus around such fully comprehensive conceptions.79  
However, Rawls also relies on a much more peculiar 
notion, that of a “partially comprehensive” conception, 
which comprises “a number of, but by no means all, 
nonpolitical values and virtues and is rather loosely 
articulated.”80  This is an odd locution.  It is like saying 
that a person with a speck of dirt on his shoulder is 
partially buried.  Evidently “comprehensive” refers to any 
conception of the good not derivable from constructivism, 
even if it is itself not very comprehensive at all.81 
                     
76 Political Liberalism, 58.  
77 Ibid., 13. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., 61. 
80 Ibid., 13.  
81 Ruth Abbey uses the comprehensive/noncomprehensive distinction in a 
different way.  For her, a conception is comprehensive if it has 
implications outside the sphere that is conventionally deemed 
political.  “It is unclear what remains of a strictly political 
conception [if, as Rawls states in his late work,] there is no domain 
or space immune from the principles of justice.  What does a purely 
political liberalism demarcate if its principles penetrate all (or 
most) aspects of life?”  Ruth Abbey, “Back toward a Comprehensive 
Liberalism?  Justice as Fairness, Gender, and Families,” Political 
Theory 35 (2007): 17.  For this reason, she thinks that Rawls embraces 
a comprehensive liberalism as soon as he holds that principles of 
justice apply to relations within families.  Rawls’s answer would be 
that liberalism is political, even when it regulates the family, 
because its only concern is to protect the exercise of the moral powers 
in the fundamental cases.  Other concerns are excluded.  Rawls always 
regarded the family as part of the basic structure.  See Martha C. 
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 Are “partially comprehensive” conceptions impossible 
bases of social unity?  Consider one possibility:  a 
political liberalism that guarantees to everyone the 
opportunity to exercise the moral powers, but also 
opportunities for sexual satisfaction, at least via 
heterosexual intercourse within marriage.  In other words, 
Rawls’s constructivism with one tiny bit added.  Call it 
C+S (constructivism plus sex).  The addition of that tiny 
bit makes C+S into a partially comprehensive conception.  
Why would one think that this diminishes the prospects for 
social unity?  It rather seems to increase the likelihood 
of social unity, at least compared with constructivism, 
since so many people are persuaded that FGM violates basic 
justice. 
 The real problem is that the bit that has been added 
is not derived from the moral powers, in the way the other 
goods on the list were.  It lacks constructivist 
credentials.  Once the bouncer has let this patron in, the 
lack of such credentials can no longer be a principled 
reason to exclude others.  If there is such a reason, it 
can’t be derived from constructivism.  The addition of FGM 
is not like a small additional wing on the constructivist 
building.  To vary the metaphor, it is more like a knife in 
a clam.  Once the blade gets in, the clam has no resources 
left for keeping anything else out. 
Rawls evidently thinks that pure constructivism is the 
only reliable path to social unity.  In modern societies, 
there is so much normative pluralism that the only 
overlapping consensus that is consistent with respectful 
relations is that constructed without any reference to the 
actual normative views of members of society.  That is why 
“partially comprehensive” views must be excluded.  
Political liberalism, he argues, should be freestanding, so 
that it “can be presented without saying, or knowing, or 
hazarding a conjecture about, what [comprehensive] 
doctrines it may belong to, or be supported by.”82  “[T]he 
political conception of justice is worked out first as a 
freestanding view that can be justified pro tanto without 
looking to, or trying to fit, or even knowing what are, the 
existing comprehensive doctrines.”83  This approach may 
                                                             
Nussbaum, “Rawls and Feminism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, 
500-03 (collecting pertinent passages in Rawls’s work). 
82 Political Liberalism, 12-13. 
83 John Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” J. Phil. 42 (1995): 145. For similar 
formulations, see Political Liberalism, xlvii; “The Idea of Public 
Reason Revisited,” 585; Restatement, 37, 188-89.  T.M. Scanlon explains 
why the strategy of surveying actual comprehensive views would not be 
satisfactory to Rawls.  “It would be impossible to survey all possible 
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possibly work under certain circumstances, but they are 
likely to be as unusual as the circumstances in which it is 
safe to drive a car while blindfolded. 
Rawls aspires to “civic friendship,” in which we the 
citizens exercise power over one another on the basis of 
“reasons we might reasonably expect that they, as free and 
equal citizens, might reasonably also accept.”84  In order 
for people to be “reasonable where others are concerned,” 
Rawls writes, they must be “willing to govern their conduct 
by a principle from which they and others can reason in 
common.”85  Citing and paraphrasing the more fully 
elaborated view of Thomas Scanlon, Rawls writes that in 
order to be reasonable, we should want “to be able to 
justify our actions to others on grounds they could not 
reasonably reject – reasonably, that is, given the desire 
to find principles that others similarly motivated could 
not reasonably reject.”86  Comprehensive doctrines can 
reasonably be rejected.  “Since there are many reasonable 
doctrines, the idea of the reasonable does not require us, 
or others, to believe any specific reasonable doctrine, 
though we may do so.”87   
This formulation carries with it some of the 
difficulties of Scanlon’s own view.  Unity with others may 
be attractive, but we give up on that as soon as we decide 
that what matters is what they would accept were they 
reasonable, rather than what they actually accept.  
Scanlon’s criterion of ideal justifiability, Colin McGinn 
observes, “effectively surrenders the idea that morality 
necessarily involves unity with others – actual unity, I 
                                                             
comprehensive views and inadequate, in an argument for stability, to 
consider just those that are represented in a given society at a given 
time since others may emerge at any time and gain adherents.”  “Rawls 
on Justification,” 164.  On the other hand, a consensus built around 
the convergence of a contingent set of actual views may last a long 
time. 
84 “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 579. 
85 Political Liberalism, 49 n.1. 
86 Ibid., 49 n.2, citing T.M. Scanlon, “Contractualism and 
Utilitarianism,” in Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams, eds., 
Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
1982).  This concern about what it is reasonable to expect people to 
accept goes back to Rawls’s early writings.  See John Rawls, “Justice 
as Fairness,” in Collected Papers, 59.  Freeman observes that the 
historical order of influence is from Rawls to Scanlon.  Justice and 
the Social Contract, 93, 148. 
87 Political Liberalism, 60. 
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mean.  For what is the point of unity with purely 
hypothetical others?”88   
Rawls’s aspiration is similarly hypothetical.  “[O]ur 
exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is 
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials 
of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be 
expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals 
acceptable to their common human reason.”89   
This hypothetical aspiration is still present even in 
Rawls’s last, somewhat chastised conception of the 
possibility of social unity.  Rawls eventually acknowledged 
that there is “a family of reasonable though differing 
liberal political conceptions.”90  Even if Rawls’s basic 
framework is accepted, “there are indefinitely many 
considerations that may be appealed to in the original 
position and each alternative conception of justice is 
favored by some considerations and disfavored by others.”91  
Freeman observes that the concession that there will not be 
general agreement on justice as fairness “must have been an 
enormous disappointment to him, for he had worked for 
nearly forty years trying to show how a well-ordered 
society where everyone accepts justice as fairness as its 
public charter is a realistic possibility . . . .”92   
The family of reasonable conceptions still evidently 
includes only those that can arguably satisfy Scanlonian 
standards.  For any of these conceptions, “when terms are 
proposed as the most reasonable terms of fair cooperation, 
those proposing them must think it at least reasonable for 
others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, and not 
as dominated or manipulated or under pressure caused by an 
inferior political or social position.”93  As Freeman puts 
it, “[e]ven if reasonable and rational democratic citizens 
cannot agree on the same conception of liberal justice – 
not to mention the most reasonable conception for Rawls, 
justice as fairness – all are under a duty to propose and 
                     
88 Colin McGinn, “Reasons and Unreasons” (review of T.M. Scanlon, What 
We Owe to Each Other), New Republic, May 24, 1999, 37.  Similar 
objections have been raised by Jurgen Habermas and Cristina Lafont.  
Jurgen Habermas, “Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason:  
Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” J. Phil. 42 (1995): 122; 
Cristina Lafont, “Moral Objectivity and Reasonable Agreement:  Can 
Realism Be Reconciled with Kantian Constructivism?”, Ratio Juris 17:1 
(2004): 27-51.    
89 Political Liberalism, 137, emphasis added. 
90 Ibid., xxxviii.  See also “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 582. 
91 Rawls, Restatement, 133. 
92 Freeman, Rawls, xiii. 
93 The Law of Peoples, 14. 
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support laws that they can reasonably expect other citizens 
can reasonably endorse in their capacity as free and equal 
citizens.”94  The aspiration to hypothetical agreement 
remains a regulatory norm even after it is admitted that 
the aspiration for actual agreement is forlorn. 
The reasonableness here is not the reasonableness of 
prediction, the way we ask whether it’s reasonable to think 
that you can get that jalopy to start on this frigid 
morning.  It is not a claim about what it is probable that 
the citizens of a society will endorse.  Rather, it is a 
claim about what it is reasonable to ask them to endorse.  
The payoff may then be, not social unity, but confidence in 
our own righteousness as we gird for political warfare.  If 
the demands of constructivism are reasonable, but our 
fellow citizens do not in fact endorse them, then that is 
their fault and not constructivism’s.  We may not be able 
to have unity with them, but we can have unity with 
hypothetical reasonable others. 
A more charitable reading would understand Rawls and 
Scanlon as making proposals, proffering terms of 
cooperation that are a possible basis for community among 
persons with differing views.  “Putting people’s 
comprehensive doctrines behind the veil of ignorance 
enables us to find a political conception of justice that 
can be the focus of an overlapping consensus and thereby 
serve as a public basis of justification in a society 
marked by the fact of reasonable pluralism.”95  The path to 
actual civic friendship leads through reasonable terms of 
cooperation.96 
If what you want is unity with actual others, however, 
you had better learn what those others think before you 
start proposing terms of cooperation with them.  Rawls’s 
answer, abstracting away from all comprehensive views, is 
problematic from his own perspective if the regime it 
produces so alienates some citizens that they no longer 
feel themselves part of the political community.  The 
consequences of excluding “partially comprehensive” views 
may be unacceptable to some.  If, as I have argued, 
                     
94 Freeman, Rawls, 379.  See also “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 
578; Burton Dreben, “On Rawls and Political Liberalism,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Rawls, 338-39. 
95 The Law of Peoples, 32. 
96 That the aim is to contain disagreement within a framework of mutual 
respect is particularly clear in T.M. Scanlon, “The Difficulty of 
Tolerance,” in David Heyd, ed., Toleration: An Elusive Virtue 
(Princeton:  Princeton Univ. Press, 1998), 226-39, which is cited with 
approval in Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 588 n.42. 
Limits of Constructivism  Koppelman 
 24
constructivism cannot cognize atrocities such as FGM, they 
may even be unacceptable to you. 
Of course, if a thicker conception of the good than 
that imagined by constructivism is integral to the basic 
structure of the regime, that will alienate some people, 
too.  The immigrant mother considered earlier, for example.  
You’re going to have political alienation whatever you do.97  
It can’t be eliminated.  But it can be minimized.  One can 
try to have as small a remainder of alienated people as one 
can manage.  And even with respect to them, the regime will 
be a good deal less brutal if it understands that 
remainders are inevitable.98  The task of achieving that is 
a prudential one, involving practical consequential 
judgments.  The problems it raises are not resolvable from 
the standpoint of high theory.  Constructivism is one 
possible solution, perhaps suitable for a society that 
faces a maximum of moral disagreement.  But that does not 
appear to be our situation. 
 The question with which Rawls begins is still the 
right question to ask:  "how is it possible for there to 
exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal 
citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable 
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?"99  Rawls’s 
response is political liberalism.  Constructivism of the 
kind he contemplates is part of any possible answer; a 
system that denies some people the opportunity to exercise 
their moral powers in the fundamental cases is not a system 
of cooperation at all.100  (I regard the present article as 
a friendly amendment to Rawls.)  But must political 
liberalism stop there?  The answer depends on what counts 
as political liberalism.  Perhaps Rawls’s understanding of 
the demands of political liberalism is too stringent, so 
that conceptions that may in fact be attractive bases for 
social unity, such as C+S, are unnecessarily excluded. 
                     
97 Steven D. Smith, “Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions:  
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Limits of Constructivism  Koppelman 
 25
 In order for a conception of justice to be political, 
Rawls writes, three conditions must be satisfied:  it must 
apply solely to the basic structure of society, be 
independent of any wider comprehensive doctrine, and be 
elaborated in terms of ideas implicit in a society’s public 
political culture.101  Given his broad definition of what 
counts as a wider comprehensive doctrine, this seems to 
permit only some variety of constructivism.  Anything else, 
such as C+S, violates the second condition. 
 If one wants an overlapping consensus without 
constructivism, then it will not do simply to remove 
Rawls’s second condition.  That lets in far too much.  So 
the criteria for political liberalism must be revised 
altogether.   
The kind of wholesale revision that I am suggesting 
has already been undertaken, unannounced, in the recent 
work of Martha Nussbaum.  Nussbaum claims that she is a 
“political liberal,” and says that in this she is following 
Rawls.102  However, she justifies this label for her own, 
capabilities-based conception of justice on very different 
grounds than Rawls relies upon:  (1) it is openended and 
subject to revision; (2) its terms are specified in an 
abstract way; (3) it is “freestanding” in that it is not 
grounded in any particular moral conception; (4) it 
emphasizes capability and not functioning, so that people 
can choose whether to exercise any particular capability; 
(5) the major liberties that protect pluralism, such as 
freedom of speech, are central on the list; (6) it is not a 
basis for intervention in the affairs of other states, 
absent crimes against humanity.103   
Nussbaum silently abandons Rawls’s constructivist 
sense of “freestanding,” by which he means that a 
conception “can be presented without saying, or knowing, or 
hazarding a conjecture about, what [comprehensive] 
doctrines it may belong to, or be supported by.”104  For 
Nussbaum, “freestanding” means that a conception “does not 
contain any particular metaphysical or epistemological 
doctrine, and can be rendered compatible with the major 
ones that citizens may hold.”105  It is obviously a good 
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deal easier to satisfy Nussbaum’s requirement than Rawls’s.  
Many partly comprehensive views could meet Nussbaum’s 
criteria; none could meet Rawls’s.106 
It is unsurprising, then, that Linda Barclay disputes 
Nussbaum’s claim to be a political liberal.  Barclay has 
argued that the controversial goods on Nussbaum’s 
capabilities list show that Nussbaum is not a political 
liberal at all, but rather has formulated a distinctive 
kind of comprehensive liberalism, “a theory that takes as 
its most central value the realisation of each individual’s 
capacity to choose and pursue their own conception of the 
good life.”107  Nussbaum responds by acknowledging the 
controversial elements of her conception, but (here 
silently reducing the six characteristics above to the 
single most important one) she insists that her conception 
is still “acceptable to people holding many different views 
of life.”108  This criterion is responsive to the needs of a 
pluralistic society, but it is also less formal and, more 
importantly, less demanding than that laid down by Rawls.  
If Nussbaum is a political liberal, it is because she has 
redefined political liberalism in a way that makes the club 
of political liberals easier to get into.  This move is 
objectionable if and only if pure constructivism, of the 
kind that Rawls offers, is the best way to respond to the 
fact of pluralism.   
There is a certain ipse dixit quality to Nussbaum’s 
capabilities list:  none of the elements are argued for; 
she simply hopes that the reader will agree that these are 
necessary elements of a decent human life.109  She is, at 
                     
106 Rawls rejects, as “political in the wrong way,” a conception of the 
primary goods according to which we “look at the various comprehensive 
doctrines actually found in society and specify an index of such goods 
so as to be near to those doctrines’ center of gravity, so to speak; 
that is, so as to find a kind of average of what those who affirmed 
those views would need by way of institutional claims and protections 
and all-purpose means.”  Political Liberalism, 39.  This may, however, 
be an accurate description of Nussbaum’s procedure. 
107 Linda Barclay, “What Kind of Liberal is Martha Nussbaum?,” Sats – 
Nordic Journal of Philosophy 4 (2003): 17. 
108 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Political Liberalism and Respect:  A Response to 
Linda Barclay,” Sats – Nordic Journal of Philosophy 4 (2003): 29; see 
also Women and Human Development, 74. 
109 Freeman observes that Nussbaum’s capabilities list “is largely 
expositive; there is little detailed argument for the items on her list 
and nothing resembling a constructivist procedure like Rawls’s original 
position to connect her principles of justice with an ideal of persons 
and society.”  Samuel Freeman, “Frontiers of Justice:  The Capabilities 
Approach vs. Contractarianism,” Tex. L. Rev. 85 (2006): 391.  Nussbaum 
writes that with respect to each item on her list, “an intuitive 
argument must be made that a life without a sufficient level of each of 
Limits of Constructivism  Koppelman 
 27
the same time, cautious about saying too much.  Thus she is 
not even willing to say that the exercise of the 
capabilities is good, since that does not show enough 
respect for those who disagree.110  This effort to be just 
barely specific enough is a delicate one.  It is not clear 
how one can valorize a capability without valorizing what 
the capability is for.111  But if the execution of her 
project generates puzzles, the project itself is the right 
one to undertake:  to minimize the remainder, while taking 
a stand on those matters with respect to which she is 




 I noted at the outset that constructivism has two 
attractions:  it provides a secure foundation for human 
rights, and it makes possible a kind of civic unity in the 
face of intractable differences about what is good.  It 
should now be clear that both of these selling points need 
to be qualified.  Constructivism provides a foundation for 
some rights, but others equally urgent will require support 
from some other source.  The civic unity constructivism 
offers may not be the most inclusive unity available in our 
society. 
 What can we say about the intractability of 
disagreement about the human good?  Sometimes goods can be 
bad.  Different people have different ideas about what 
makes a life good, and these differences may make it hard 
to live together in a mutually respectful way.  Introducing 
controversial conceptions of the good into politics can 
have pernicious consequences.  It is necessary somehow to 
contain goodness.  Rawls’s constructivism attempts to 
filter out bad goods.  But, as we have seen, it filters out 
too much; it is unable to cognize some goods that are 
intensely relevant to questions of justice. 
It is sometimes appropriate to define some good, for 
political purposes, at a high level of abstraction, so that 
it incorporates unorthodox as well as conventional 
variants.  The state will then be neutral among those 
variants, and so filter out conceptions of the good that 
                                                             
these entitlements is a life so reduced that it is not compatible with 
human dignity.”  Frontiers of Justice, 278-79. 
110 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience:  In Defense of 
America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (New York:  Basic Books, 
2008), 168-69. 
111 Kimberly A. Yuracko, Perfectionism and Contemporary Feminist Values 
(Bloomington:  Indiana U. Press, 2003), 41-46; Barclay, 15-16. 
Limits of Constructivism  Koppelman 
 28
are inappropriately specific.  But whether this is so in 
any particular case will depend on the reasons for 
abstraction that obtain in that particular case.112 
The opening of discourse on justice to partly 
comprehensive views is not a prescription for civil peace.  
It means that there will be endless contestation and 
negotiation about the kind and degree of neutrality we will 
have.  Rawls concludes his final book with the sober 
reflection that if his political ideal of reasonableness 
cannot be realized, “[i]f . . .human beings are largely 
amoral, if not incurably cynical and self-centered, one 
might ask, with Kant, whether it is worthwhile for human 
beings to live on the earth.”113  But these are not the only 
possibilities.  It is possible that the specific terms of 
reasonable cooperation proposed by Rawls are not feasible, 
but that human beings nonetheless continue to strive for 
respectful cooperation, albeit on different terms than 
Rawls proposes.  That striving, in a context of continuing 
disagreement about justice, is not the constructivist 
vision of social unity.  But it may be “the deepest and 
most reasonable basis of social unity available to us as 
citizens of a modern democratic society.”114 
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